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In argumentation, metaphors are often considered as ambiguous or deceptive uses of
language leading to fallacies of reasoning. However, they can also provide useful insights
into creative argumentation, leading to genuinely new knowledge. Metaphors entail a
framing effect that implicitly provides a specific perspective to interpret the world, guiding
reasoning and evaluation of arguments. In the same vein, emotions could be in sharp
contrast with proper reasoning, but they can also be cognitive processes of affective
framing, influencing our reasoning and behavior in different meaningful ways. Thus, a
double (metaphorical and affective) framing effect might influence argumentation in the
case of emotive metaphors, such as “Poverty is a disease” or “Your boss is a dictator,”
where specific “emotive words” (disease, dictator) are used as vehicles. We present and
discuss the results of two experimental studies designed to explore the role of emotive
metaphors in argumentation. The studies investigated whether and to what extent the
detection of a fallacious argument is influenced by the presence of a conventional vs.
novel emotive metaphor. Participants evaluated a series of verbal arguments containing
either “non-emotive” or “emotive” (positive or negative) metaphors as middle terms that
“bridge” the premises of the argument. The results show that the affective coherence
of the metaphor’s vehicle and topic plays a crucial role in participants’ reasoning style,
leading to global heuristic vs. local analytical interpretive processes in the interplay of the
metaphorical and the affective framing effects.
Keywords: metaphor, emotions, framing, equivocation fallacy, affective coherence, reasoning, belief in the
conclusion, meaning ambiguity
INTRODUCTION
Previous research in argumentation theory showed that reasoning errors, far from just leading to
argumentation fallacies, might shed light on how we reason and what influences our evaluation
of arguments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Van Eemeren, 1992; Ariely, 2009; Walton, 2010).
Reasoning errors have a psychological dimension (Macagno and Walton, 2010; Walton, 2010;
Godden, 2015), as they are arguments that seem to be sound without being so in terms of
norms and standards (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004; Tindale, 2006; Walton, 2006). Their
psychological dimension is tightly connected to their linguistic dimension, as also the linguistic
formulation of arguments may lead to fallacies of reasoning (Oswald et al., 2018, 2020; Hinton,
2019; Schumann et al., 2020). Fallacies of reasoning might reveal how we make sense of arguments,
especially when they are formulated in natural languages, where ambiguous, polysemous, and
non-literal use of words is widespread (Ervas et al., 2018). Far from being patently irrational
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when committing a fallacy, people might just be drawn by
the intuitive search for alternative reasons, as in the case of
metaphors used in argumentation (Ervas et al., 2018). This
argumentation style fits more with the “natural logic” invoked in
a pragmatic perspective, where the speaker’s meaning is grasped
as the conclusion of an inference that makes sense of an apparent
meaning violation (Grice, 1989).
Metaphors rarely come “alone,” lacking the affective
dimension, as they often communicate an emotional meaning
(Fainsilber and Ortony, 1987; Schnall, 2005), whether positive
as in “My partner is a rose” or negative as in “My job is a jail,”
which also contributes to the evaluation of arguments (Macagno
and Rossi, 2021). The emotive language used in argumentation
might have crucial implications when accepting the conclusion
of an argument (Macagno and Walton, 2014; Pollaroli et al.,
2019). Here, the term “argumentation” is used in a wider sense,
covering all the reasons in support of the conclusions that a
speaker wishes the addressee to draw from some premises.
Ordinary evaluations might use other sources of reasoning,
departing from normative standards and/or independent from
the argument itself, i.e., actual premises and their connection
to the conclusion, as already shown in the case of arguments
featuring metaphors (Ervas et al., 2015, 2018). The paper aims
to explore how emotions and figurative language interact in the
evaluation of arguments where “emotive metaphors” connect the
premises to a conclusion.
In the Western philosophical tradition, the notion of
argumentation has often denied both emotions and figurative
language the status of reasoning resources. Argumentation has
been defined as a critical use of reason in judgment, often
in contrast to emotions (Oaksford et al., 1996; Blanchette
et al., 2018): rational justification seems to be the unique
relevant source of knowledge at a normative level, while
emotions are subjective feelings conveying only perspectives.
Emotions safeguard compelling and fleeting interests, and can
be “recalcitrant” to reason and arguments (Greenspan, 1988,
1992, 2004; Stocker and Hegeman, 1996; DeLancey, 2002, 2007;
D’Arms and Jacobson, 2003). Emotions are often processed in an
automatic, unconscious, and obliged way, while the critical use
of reason is supposed to be conscious and controlled. Previous
experimental studies have challenged this view (Blanchette and
Caparos, 2013; Blanchette, 2014), and proposed that conscious
thought does not always lead to a better performance than
unconscious thought when complex decisions have to be made
[but see Rossi (2013) and Rossi (2014)]. Due to a wider
capacity to deal with multiple information, Dijksterhuis (2004,
p. 593) claimed that the “unconscious also actively thinks,” by
associating and integrating the various alternatives in memory
[see also Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) and Dijksterhuis et al. (2009)].
Other studies have investigated how positive and negative
emotions differently influence both content and style of thought,
playing an important role in the regulation of the global-local
information processing (Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005; Clore
and Huntsinger, 2007).
Nonetheless, figurative language has often been considered
so rich in suggestion as to be dangerous in argumentation
(Beardsley, 1957). Metaphors have been described as the
“exemplars of the improper” (Maasen, 2000, p. 199), leading to
fallacies of reasoning in argumentation. They have often been
counted as semantic anomalies, deviations from the language
properly used in argumentation (Hoffman, 1980; Tourangeau
and Sternberg, 1982), or as ornamental devices inessential to
argumentation. That metaphor is just a deviant or an ornamental
use of language has been largely questioned both in philosophy by
Max Black (1954, 1962) and in cognitive linguistics by Lakoff and
Johnson (1980). In understanding an abstract concept (the target)
in terms of a concrete concept (the source), metaphor implicitly
provides a frame to think of and to reason about the target,
selecting some relevant properties of the source and neglecting
others (Entman, 1993; Burgers et al., 2016). Still, in the conceptual
metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), studies focusing
on metaphorical reasoning [see Thibodeau et al. (2019) for a
review] widely acknowledge that the metaphorical framing effect
can often work covertly and affect reasoning and evaluation of
arguments [Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011; but see Steen et al.
(2014) for criticism].
From this perspective, metaphor plays an alternative role with
respect to reasoning, conceived as the critical and deliberate
use of rationality. The framing effect is interpreted as a
cognitive bias, influencing how people make decisions or express
their evaluations based on how an issue or an argument is
presented, rather than following proper logical or normative
rules. Something similar can be said about affective framing: that
it is another strategy to exploit emotions to frame information
and manipulate both reasoning and decision-making. Emotions
can be used to present the linguistic formulation of an argument
with a specific (positive or negative) valence, which can be
considered as a special “semantic primitive” determining the
intended (positive or negative) meaning (Barrett et al., 2007).
Maiese (2014, p. 524) proposed the term “affective framing”
to express the idea that emotions are “a spontaneous, non-
inferential, and pre-reflective way of discriminating, filtering, and
selecting information that allows us to reduce the overwhelming
clutter of information” [see also DeLancey (2002), Solomon
(2003), and Prinz (2004)]. From this perspective, emotions can
strongly influence the evaluation of arguments (e.g., Schwarz
and Clore, 1983; Bless et al., 1996; Schwarz and Skurnik, 2003).
Scholars have argued for a hidden and overwhelming force of
emotions overcoming normative rules in various types of social
reasoning (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus, 2002; MacKuen et al.,
2010; Angie et al., 2011). In moral reasoning, scenarios based on
strong emotional reactions have been used to insist on the “moral
doumbfounding” effect of emotions: for instance, experiencing a
strong disgust reaction after reading a story of “consensual incest”
brings many participants to remain stubbornly committed to a
judgment of moral inappropriateness despite the fact that they
are unable to propose adequate arguments to justify their initial
emotional intuition [see also Haidt et al. (2000), Haidt (2001, p.
814), and Haidt (2007)].
Previous research has highlighted the evaluative connotations
entailed by the framing effect present in metaphors, such as
“Poverty is a disease” or “Your boss is a dictator,” where
specific “emotive words” (disease/dictator) are intentionally used
(Stevenson, 1944; Macagno and Walton, 2014). These examples
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illustrate how metaphors might guide our reasoning, not only by
framing arguments with vividness and forceful figurative images,
but also by entailing the communication of emotional attitudes
and value judgments (Semino, 2008; Burgers et al., 2016). In
this paper, we investigate the double framing effect of emotive
metaphors in arguments, and check whether and to what extent
the presence of an “emotive metaphor” influences the detection
of fallacies.
The Metaphorical Framing Effect on
Argumentation
Scholars have shown that metaphors can be useful in
argumentation to introduce a standpoint or to underpin it
(Wagemans, 2016, 2019; van Poppel, 2018, 2020), while in
the context of science, metaphors have been used to stimulate
creative thinking (Blackburn, 1984; Hofstadter, 1995; Indurkhya,
2010). Recent studies have reconsidered traditional approaches
to metaphor as a reasoning device (Black, 1962; Hesse, 1963,
1965; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Indurkhya, 2007),
claiming that metaphor itself might be considered as an
“implicit argument” where the addressee is led along a chain of
inferences from the source to the target to draw some conclusion
(Santibáñez, 2010; Macagno and Zavatta, 2014; Oswald and Rihs,
2014; Svačinova, 2014). Other studies (Ervas et al., 2018; Ervas,
2019; Cavazzana and Bolognesi, 2020) claimed that metaphors,
as implicit arguments, can be considered as enthymemes, having a
syllogistic form of reasoning with implicit premises. Specifically,
the syllogism would have the metaphor as the first premise and
the relevant property or properties to attribute to the target as a
second premise. Here, the role of the middle term connecting the
premises to the conclusion is played by the vehicle, the linguistic
term that refers to the source concept of the metaphor, which
also provides a frame for interpreting the target concept.
When considering the metaphorical framing effect in
reasoning, and its influence on the evaluation of arguments,
most empirical studies focused on conventional metaphors
(Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011, 2015), which are quite
frequent and already lexicalized for a given linguistic community.
On the contrary, novel metaphors might well be used as relevant
moves in argumentation (van Poppel, 2018, 2020; Macagno,
2020), which intentionally frame a discourse to interfere with,
or even lead, the reasoning process. When argumentation
intentionally exploits a metaphor, the robust notion of truth
needs to be dropped: sentences featuring a metaphor are literally
“patently” false, because of their conventional meaning. Still,
from a pragmatic perspective, we find “an alternative truth” in
the Gricean natural logic, interpreting the speaker’s meaning
and making sense of the sentence according to the context
(Grice, 1975, 1989; Clark, 1994; Wilson and Sperber, 2002).
The Gricean cooperative principle assumes that, beyond being
informative, sentences are true. However, sentences featuring
conventional and novel metaphors are processed in very different
ways when it comes to their truth evaluations. Empirical
research (Glucksberg, 2001, 2003; Giora, 2003) has shown that
most sentences with conventional metaphors are perceived as
true though they are literally false, while most sentences with
novel metaphors are processed as false. Response times also
suggest a metaphorical interference effect in the truth evaluation
of a sentence (Glucksberg et al., 1982). In particular, novel
metaphors with unfamiliar meanings cannot be inhibited or
ignored, which explains why it takes less time, compared to
conventional metaphors, to judge whether sentences featuring
novel metaphors are false. Consequently, the process of truth
evaluation of the sentence in which the metaphor occurs also
influences the evaluation of the whole argument having the
metaphorical sentence as a premise.
For conventional metaphors, the relevant properties
attributed to the target come from a “system of associated
commonplaces” (Black, 1954), which are usually assumed to be
true or just believed as belonging to the source concept. The
relevant properties are often stereotypically believed to belong
to the source concept (Ervas, 2017; Borelli and Cacciari, 2019),
possibly leading to fallacies of reasoning (Fischer, 2014, 2015).
When they are applied to the target, the preservation of truth
in the conclusion is never guaranteed. The speaker’s beliefs
about the source concept can thus influence the conclusion
of the argument featuring a metaphor. People might accept
the conclusion of an argument just because they believe in
it, rather than because it logically follows from the premises
(Ball et al., 2006; Correia, 2011; Ball and Thompson, 2018),
thereby influencing the evaluation of the whole argument
(Ervas et al., 2018).
The Affective Framing Effect on
Argumentation
As for metaphors, having an embodied (re)framing effect
does not automatically mean that emotions can be viewed
just as a covert and subconscious force that makes reasoning
derails into fallacies. Emotions can have both a bodily and a
cognitive-evaluative dimension, as they are the means by which
personally relevant environmental information is made available
and meaningful to the experiences of a subject (Maiese, 2015).
Therefore, precisely for their framing effect, emotions can be
considered as an important source of knowledge (Damasio,
1994). As cognitive processes used to represent the positive and
negative valence of objects, people and/or actions in the world,
they might play a crucial role in reasoning because of their strong
evaluative dimension (Caruana and Cuccio, 2017). Although
emotions are not explicitly intentional (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux,
1996), they can guide our behavior and be useful predictors of
actions: negatively valenced stimuli represent potential threats
demanding an immediate response (Rozin and Royzman, 2001;
Citron et al., 2014). Previous research showed that positively
valenced contexts reduces or even eliminates possible framing
effects in decision-making (Cassotti et al., 2012).
Some studies have shown that when emotions are conveyed
by verbal stimuli, they strongly affect reading times (Kissler
et al., 2006; Citron, 2012). Specifically, emotionally-valenced
terms are processed faster and more accurately than neutral
terms (Larsen et al., 2006; Kousta et al., 2009). Behavioral
ratings of emotionally-valenced stimuli show that both highly
positively valenced and negatively valenced stimuli are more
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arousing than neutral stimuli (Bradley and Lang, 1999) and
negatively valenced stimuli are usually rated as more arousing
than positively valenced stimuli (Citron et al., 2013). When
emotions are more difficult to translate into plain language, we
might resort to non-literal and/or figurative language, where
meanings can afford one with the liberty to implicitly convey
emotions without being overtly committed to the literal value of
the words (Gibbs et al., 2002; Ervas, 2020). Kövecses (2000, 2005),
who dedicated his work to the different perspectives entailed by
metaphors expressing emotions, refers to this use of language as
the figurative descriptive function of emotive terms.
Previous research investigated how frames affect individuals’
beliefs on a variety of issues, focusing on the place of emotions
in the framing process (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a; Scherer et al.,
2014). Being spontaneous action tendencies, emotions can have a
direct behavioral effect, but can also indirectly affect judgment,
by generating other emotions, or by changing the preference
ordering in motivations (Elster, 1999). Previous studies also
focused on different cognitive processes explaining how framing
effects operate, such as accessibility change, making information
more salient, belief importance change, altering the weight of
information, or belief content change, adding new information
potentially changing the conclusion (Slothuus, 2008), but also
affective factors might have a role in mediating framing effects
(Gross and D’Ambrosio, 2004; Gross, 2008). The valence of the
terms in a message modulates the subjective state of feeling
pleasure or displeasure in response to themessage (Lecheler et al.,
2013). Frames themselves often rely upon emotional appeals,
represented by “emotion-laden” terms, which could be properly
designed to elicit positive vs. negative emotional reactions. This
is also the case of emotive metaphors, whose framing effect does
not merely depend on the properties selected from the source
term, the vehicle, but also on the affective (positive vs. negative)
valence of the target term, the topic. Both the metaphorical and
the affective framing play a role in the interpretation of the target,
influencing people’s evaluation of the whole sentence featuring
the metaphor. However, it is not clear how the metaphorical
framing and the affective framing interact in the evaluation of an
argument featuring an emotive metaphor.
Current Research
In argumentation theory, the fallacies of ambiguity are based
on some equivocation of meaning, possibly caused by different
literal meanings of the same word (Walton, 1996; Tindale,
2006). In linguistics, lexical ambiguity includes both homonymy
(referring to words with two completely different literal
meanings) and polysemy (referring to words with two partially
overlapping literal meanings). The vehicle of a conventional
metaphor has a literal and a lexicalised non-literal meaning and
can be considered more similar to polysemy (Carston, 1997,
2002). Novel metaphors cannot be considered as cases of lexical
ambiguity, because of the completely new and creative non-
literal meaning of their vehicles (Ervas, 2015). However, fallacies
of ambiguity can also be caused by metaphors, whose vehicle
can have both a literal and a non-literal meaning. Previous
research (Ervas et al., 2015, 2018) investigated the role of different
types of meaning ambiguity as a possible source of fallacious
reasoning in argumentation, ranging from literal (homonymy
and polysemy) to metaphorical (conventional and novel) words.
Ervas et al. (2018) showed that people commit an ambiguity
fallacy, especially when evaluating syllogisms with a conventional
metaphor as the middle term, i.e., the term that connects the
premises of an argument, and with a plausible conclusion. The
authors suggested that, when arguments do not present a patently
false conclusion, the participants could accept the conclusion just
because it is believed to be true on the basis of a priori beliefs, and
not because it logically follows from the premises. The belief in the
conclusion bias is well-known to influence the overall evaluation
of arguments (Evans et al., 1983; Oakhill et al., 1989; Oakhill
and Garnham, 1993; Ball et al., 2006; Correia, 2011; Ball and
Thompson, 2018), possibly leading to a reinterpretation of the
premises in a creative search for alternative reasons to hold the
conclusion (Oakhill et al., 1989; Oakhill and Garnham, 1993; Ball
et al., 2006). For conventional metaphors, which go unnoticed
to the participants in reading the premises, the meaning of the
middle term could be revitalized to justify the conclusion (Ervas
et al., 2018).
An example of a standard equivocation fallacy (or
quaternio terminorum) featuring a metaphor as middle term is
the following:
P1: B.B. King is amyth
P2: Amyth is a traditional story
C: B.B. King is a traditional story
In the first premise (P1), “myth” is the middle term having a
metaphorical meaning, i.e., famous, outstanding person, while
in the second premise (P2), “myth” is the middle term having
a literal meaning, i.e., traditional story. Because of the meaning
shift of the term “myth,” the argument assumes the structure
of a quaternio terminorum (Barth, 1974; Macagno and Walton,
2009), i.e., a fallacious argument based on the ambiguity of its
middle term (Hamblin, 1970; Woods and Walton, 1989; Copi
et al., 2014). If themiddle term assumes a differentmeaning in the
two premises, then the syllogism contains four terms, rather than
three, which causes the fallacy. We called “metaphoric fallacy” a
quaternio terminorum based on an ambiguity connected to the
metaphorical premise of the argument (Walton, 1996; Lightbody
and Berman, 2010; Fischer, 2014).
As far as we know, previous empirical research on argument
evaluation did not include “emotive metaphors” in the premises
and did not focus on their double framing effect on the
acceptance of the conclusion. The double framing effect of
metaphors might have a strong influence on people’s beliefs
involved in the argument’s evaluation process, possibly leading
to equivocation fallacies. The double framing effect of metaphors
might depend both on the type (conventional vs. novel) and
on the emotional meaning (positive vs. negative valence) of the
metaphor featured in the first premise of the argument. This
raises the following research questions:
Q1. Under what conditions does the double framing effect
of emotive metaphors mostly influence the evaluation of the
argument, leading to a fallacy of equivocation?
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Q2. Under what conditions does the metaphorical framing
influence the evaluation of an argument? Are participants
more prone to commit a fallacy of equivocation in the case of
conventional metaphors or in the case of novel metaphors?
Q3. Under what conditions does the affective framing
influence the evaluation of the argument? Are participants
more prone to commit a fallacy of equivocation in the case
of negatively valenced metaphors or in the case of positively
valenced metaphors?
Two empirical studies were designed to address these questions
and to investigate the double framing effect of emotivemetaphors
in arguments’ evaluation. The studies were approved by the
Ethics Committee of the Department of Education, Psychology,
Philosophy, University of Cagliari (n. 25, 10/07/2018). We
tested participants’ evaluation of arguments having the standard
syllogistic form, with two premises and a plausible conclusion.
An example of syllogism with an emotive metaphor is
given below:
P1: Freedom is a smile
P2: A smile is an expression of joy
C: Freedom is an expression of joy
The middle terms, such as smile, bridge the premises and have
their metaphorical meaning in the first premise, diverging from
the literal meaning in the second premise, thus leading to a
fallacious - but still meaningful - conclusion. The middle terms
in the first premise might be either the vehicle of a conventional
metaphor (CM), or the vehicle of a novel metaphor (NM), as
in the example provided above. The middle terms might be
positively valenced (+), as in the example, negatively valenced
(−), or non-emotive (0), based on their emotional meaning.
We also devised two sets of first premises having the valence
of the metaphor vehicle respectively coherent with the valence
of the topic (Experiment 1) and incoherent with the valence of
the topic (Experiment 2), to check whether the double framing
effect depends on the emotional meaning of the vehicle or
on the emotional meaning of the overall premise featuring
the metaphor.
Hypotheses and Expectations
Based on previous research, we advanced the
following hypotheses:
H1: Emotive metaphors, i.e., metaphors based on an “emotive
word” as a vehicle, entail a double framing effect in
argumentation, systematically leading one to commit an
equivocation fallacy.
As only the metaphor vehicle is the middle term that bridges the
premises of the syllogism, we expected the participants to provide
more inaccurate responses to syllogisms with emotive metaphors
than to syllogisms with non-emotive metaphors, independently
from the affective coherence of the vehicle and the topic.
H2: The metaphorical framing effect on the evaluation of
arguments is stronger in the case of conventional rather than
novel metaphors.
We therefore expected the participants to commit more
equivocation fallacies and provide less accurate responses for
arguments that contain conventional metaphors compared to
novel metaphors, because in the former case participants are not
aware of the metaphorical framing effect, while in the latter case
they are aware of the “deviant,” creative use of language in the
premises leading to the conclusion.
H3: The affective framing effect is stronger especially in the
case of negatively valenced metaphors when compared to
non-emotive metaphors.
We therefore expected a lower accuracy in the case of arguments
with negatively valenced metaphors compared to non-emotive
metaphors, as negative stimuli represent potential threats
demanding an immediate rather than a deliberative response.
We also aimed to explore why participants could accept a
fallacious syllogism as sound, when themiddle term is an emotive
metaphor and the argument conclusion is plausible. Based on
previous research (Ervas et al., 2018), we were interested to check
whether the reasons could be:
1) Understandability: the overall syllogism with the emotive
metaphor is simply not understood by the participants, leading
to an inaccurate evaluation of the argument;
2) Convincingness: the participants feel convinced by the
argument, thus thinking it is also sound;
3) Emotional appeal: the participants is emotionally engaged or
persuaded by the argument;
4) Logical relation: the participants think to have found a logical
connection between the premises and the conclusion of the
argument, when it is not the case;
5) Ambiguity: the participants think that in the argument there
is no word used in two different meanings, when it is instead
the case;
6) Belief in the conclusion: the participants believe in what is
stated in the conclusion, independently of the content of
the premises;
7) Real-world experience: the participants are used to hearing
similar arguments in their everyday experience and thus
uncritically accept them.
We expected that the participants’ reasons to accept the fallacious
arguments as sound differ from the reasons to reject them
as fallacious. For instance, finding an ambiguity could be a
reason to reject an argument as fallacious, while the emotional
appeal of an argument could be a reason to accept a fallacious
argument as sound. We also expected some differences on the
participant’s evaluation according to the syllogism type: for
instance, syllogisms with non-emotive metaphors would be less
emotionally appealing than syllogisms with emotive metaphors,
or the participants’ belief in the conclusion would be higher in
the case of syllogisms with conventional metaphors compared to
novel metaphors (Ervas et al., 2018).
Method
For both the experiments on syllogisms with affectively coherent
and incoherent metaphors, we presented the participants a series
of fallacious syllogisms with either an emotive or a non-emotive
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metaphor as middle term and with a plausible conclusion,
asking whether the conclusion of the syllogisms follows from the
premises (“Yes”/“No” answer). Literal syllogisms were planned as
fillers to check participants’ basic ability to distinguish between
clearly strong (SL) and weak (WL) literal arguments, without
any explicit instruction, and to understand whether participants
are prone to accept fallacious literal arguments with plausible
conclusions (PL). We planned to explore why participants
answered “Yes” vs. “No,” asking the participants to rate the
syllogisms on a 1–5 Likert scale (1= least likely; 5=most likely),
based on the following measures:
1. Understandability: Do you understand the argument?
2. Convincingness: Is the argument convincing in any way?
3. Emotional appeal: Is the argument emotionally appealing?
4. Logical relation: Is the conclusion logically related to
the premises?
5. Ambiguity: Is the ambiguity at any level influencing?
6. Belief in the conclusion: Do you believe in C (independent of
P1 and P2)?
7. Real-world experience: Do you have any experience of
similar arguments?
Experimental Design
Two experiments were designed to test both the metaphorical
and the affective framing effects, and their interaction effect
on the evaluation of the metaphoric fallacy. For this, we
planned a 3×2 experimental design, having 3 “affective framing”
conditions (non-emotive vs. emotive, i.e., positively valenced
vs. negatively valenced metaphors) × 2 “metaphorical framing”
conditions (conventional vs. novel metaphors). The experiments
1 and 2 were designed to test respectively affectively coherent
vs. affectively incoherent metaphors as first premises of
the syllogisms.
Data Analyses
We planned the following coding and data analyses for both
the experiments. In the case of fallacious syllogisms with
metaphors, we calculated the scores for accuracy in the following
way: 0 for the incorrect answers “yes,” 1 for the correct
answers “no.” Indeed, participants answering “yes” think that
the conclusion follows from the premises, thus accepting the
fallacious arguments as sound, even though the middle term
is used with different meanings in the premises. For the same
reasons, in both the case of clearly weak literal arguments and
weak literal arguments with plausible conclusions, we attributed
0 for the incorrect answers “yes,” 1 for the correct answers “no.”
On the contrary, in the case of strong literal arguments with
middle terms used with the same meaning in both the premises,
we assigned 1 to the correct answers “yes” and 0 for the incorrect
answers “no.”
We checked the accuracy of responses to the literal fillers,
to ensure that the participants implicitly understood how to
distinguish between strong and weak syllogisms, even in case of
plausible conclusions. A Chi-squared test determined whether a
significant difference existed between the participants’ answers
and the correct answers in the case of literal fillers. A series
of paired t-tests were used to see whether weak literal (WL)
arguments, especially when having plausible conclusions (PL),
were more difficult to detect compared to strong literal (SL)
arguments. A Chi-squared test was also used to check whether
a significant difference existed between the participants’ answers
and the correct answers in the case of arguments with metaphors,
to see whether participants systematically failed to detect the
fallacy in each condition. We calculated the effect sizes, reporting
the Phi coefficient (ϕ) (small effect size: ϕ = 0.1; medium effect
size: ϕ = 0.3; large effect size: ϕ = 0.5).
Finally, we performed two statistical analyses for both
Experiments 1 and 2:
1. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) for accuracy to assess the
main effects of the two factors, metaphorical and affective
middle term type, and the interaction of the two factors on
the evaluation of the arguments. We calculated the effect sizes,
reporting the Eta squared coefficient (η2) (small effect size:
η2 = 0.0099; medium effect size: η2 = 0.0588; large effect size:
η2 = 0.1379);
2. An exploratory analysis on the seven measures for both
committing the fallacy (accepting the conclusion as following
from the premises, incorrect answers “yes”) and detecting
the fallacy (discarding the conclusion as not following
from the premises, correct answers “no”). A multiple
linear regression was planned to explore the impact of
the seven measures (Understandability, Convincingness,
Emotional appeal, Logical relation, Ambiguity, Belief in
the conclusion, and Real-world experience) on participants’
evaluation of the different types of syllogisms, assuming that
they could have different reasons to accept the fallacious
syllogisms as sound (“yes” answer) and to discard the
fallacious syllogisms as actually fallacious (“no” answer). We
planned to create separate linear models for 3 “affective
framing” conditions (non-emotive/positive/negative) × 2
“metaphorical framing” conditions (conventional/novel) for
“yes” and “no” responses. A multiple linear regression was
calculated to predict the dichotomous dependent variable
(“yes”/“no”) based on the seven predictors (understandability,
convincingness, emotional appeal, logical relation, ambiguity,
belief in the conclusion, and real world experience) for
novel and conventional metaphors, by entering all the
predictors simultaneously.
Rating and Pilot Studies
To provide the materials for both the experiments, we pre-
tested the (1) vehicles of the metaphors, (2) metaphors in
the first premises of the syllogisms, and (3) separate premises
and conclusions of the syllogisms in a series of rating studies
(N = 257 participants).
Metaphors’ Vehicles
We selected a set of terms (N = 206 nouns, GRADIT; De
Mauro, 2000) that could be used to form the first premises of
the arguments. All the terms were preselected according to their
number of letters (CM: M = 6.92, SD = 1.24; NM: M = 6.92,
SD = 0.67) and frequency (both CM and NM vehicles belonging
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TABLE 1 | Examples of arguments in English for each middle term condition (Experiment 1).
Non-emotive metaphors (0) Positively valenced metaphors (+) Negatively valenced metaphors (-)
CM [P1] That girl is a gem. (gemma)
[P2] A gem is a precious stone.
[C] That girl is a precious stone.
[P1] Peace is a thaw. (schiarita)
[P2] A thaw is the defreezing of ice.
[C] Peace is the defreezing of ice.
[P1] An insult is a scar. (sfregio)
[P2] A scar is a wound.
[C] An insult is a wound.
NM [P1] The rooster is a pharaoh. (faraone)
[P2] A pharaoh is a leader.
[C] The rooster is a leader.
[P1] Freedom is a smile. (risata)
[P2] A smile is an expression of joy.
[C] Freedom is an expression of joy.
[P1] A betrayal is a scald. (ustione)
[P2] A scald is a serious burn.
[C] A betrayal is a serious burn.
to the “common terms” frequency category in the GRADIT, De
Mauro, 2000). From this set, we selected the metaphors’ vehicles,
which were the same in both Experiment 1 and 2, constituting
the middle terms of the syllogisms. We selected the metaphors’
vehicles, based on the results of a rating study on their familiarity
and emotional (positively and negatively valenced) meaning,
on a 1–5 Likert Scale (1 = very negative/very unfamiliar, 5 =
very positive/very familiar). Terms with insufficient familiarity
(Mfamiliar <2) were excluded. We used three sets of metaphors’
vehicles to form the metaphors: (1) terms with definite emotional
meanings (Mpositive <4; Mnegative >2) were used as vehicles
of non-emotive metaphors; (2) terms with definite positive
emotional meanings (Mpositive >4) were used as vehicles of
positively valenced metaphors, and (3) terms with definite
negative emotional meanings (Mnegative <2) were used as
vehicles of negatively valenced metaphors. Terms already having
a lexicalized metaphorical meaning in the GRADIT were used
as vehicles of conventional metaphors. Unambiguous terms were
used as vehicles of novel metaphors, ensuring that they had no
already lexicalized figurative meanings in the GRADIT.
Metaphors
From the preselected set of terms, we also selected the
metaphors’ topics, based on their ratings for familiarity and
emotional (positively and negatively valenced) meaning, on
a 1–5 Likert Scale (1 = very negative/unfamiliar, 5 = very
positive/familiar). We devised three sets of metaphors’ topics
to form the metaphors: (1) non-emotive topics with definite
emotional meanings (Mpositive <4; Mnegative >2); (2) positively
valenced topics with definite emotional meanings (Mpositive >4);
(3) negatively valenced topics with definite emotional meanings
(Mnegative <2). A set of conventional and novel non-emotive
metaphors, the same for both the experiments, was generated
with non-emotive metaphors’ vehicles and topics for the first
premises of the syllogisms with non-emotive metaphors. Two
sets of emotive metaphors constituted the first premises of the
syllogisms with emotive metaphors: (1) a set of first premises
where the emotional meaning of the metaphors’ vehicles was
coherent with the emotional meaning of the metaphors’ topics
(Experiment 1); (2) a set of first premises where the emotional
meaning of the metaphors’ vehicles was incoherent with the
emotional meaning of the metaphors’ topics (Experiment 2).
In two separate rating studies for Experiments 1 and
2, the sets of metaphors were tested along some major
psycholinguistic variables (Bambini et al., 2014): emotional
(positively and negatively valenced) meaning, familiarity,
meaningfulness (i.e., confidence in metaphor interpretation),
and comprehension difficulty using a 1–5 Likert scale (1
= very negative/unfamiliar/meaningless/easy, 5 = very
positive/familiar/meaningful/difficult). Metaphors with
insufficient meaningfulness (Mmeaningful <2) and metaphors too
difficult to understand (Mdifficult >4) were excluded. We deemed
metaphors with no definite emotional meanings (Mpositive <4;
Mnegative >2) as non-emotive metaphors, and the metaphors
with definite emotional meanings (Mpositive >4;Mnegative <2) as
positively valenced and negatively valenced emotive metaphors
(see Table A1 in Appendix for M and SD for each measure).
Premises and Conclusions
The second premises of the syllogisms, the same in bothmaterials
of Experiment 1 and 2, made explicit the literal meaning of the
middle term provided in the GRADIT, which differs from the
metaphorical meaning of the middle term in the first premises.
We pre-tested the separate premises of all the arguments to
ensure that the participants actually attributed differentmeanings
to the middle terms in the first and the second premises of
the syllogisms. Besides the topics of emotive metaphors in the
first premises, the materials of the experiments differed for
their conclusions, which connected the metaphor’s topic to the
last term of the second premises. We also separately tested all
the premises and conclusions of the syllogisms to ensure that
participants perceived them as true or at least plausible, to avoid
false premises leading to an “ex falso quodlibet.”
Pilot Study
A pilot study on syllogisms with emotionally coherent premises
showed that participants (N = 13, nine women, four men)
accepted more fallacious arguments as sound when having
emotive metaphors rather than non-emotive metaphors as
middle terms.
Experiment 1
The goal of the experiment was to test the evaluation of
metaphoric fallacies, having a syllogistic form and an emotive
metaphor (with coherently-valenced vehicle and topic) in the
first premise. We aimed to understand whether and why
participants were prone to accept a quaternio terminorum with
a plausible conclusion as sound, especially in the case of
emotive metaphors. We also aimed to explore how different
factors (understandability, convincingness, emotional appeal,
logical relation, ambiguity, belief in the conclusion, and real-
world experience) contribute to the participants’ evaluation of
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TABLE 2 | Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) values of correct answers for
each middle term condition (Experiment 1).
Positively Negatively Non-emotive
valenced valenced
M SD M SD M SD
CM 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.17 0.15 0.25
NM 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.30
Literal Strong Weak Arguments with
arguments arguments plausible conclusion
0.97 0.13 0.90 0.24 0.79 0.26
arguments with a plausible conclusion, comparing emotive, and
non-emotive metaphorical middle terms conditions.
Participants
The participants (93 adults, 50 women, 43 men) were
undergraduate students in Communication Science at the
University of Cagliari, had Italian as their first language,
and normal/corrected vision. Since we aimed to check for
the participants’ intuitive answers on different measures
concerning the acceptability of argument conclusions, we
excluded participants (N = 2) who had advanced training in
logic and/or argumentation theory, resulting in 91 participants
(48 women, 43 men,Mage = 23.58 years, SDage = 7.41 years).
Materials
Participants were presented with a set of N = 36 arguments
in Italian (see Table A2 in Appendix), having the structure
of syllogisms with plausible conclusions. The set of arguments
contained N = 8 non-emotive metaphors, four conventional
(CM0) and four novel (NM0); N = 8 positively valenced
metaphors, four conventional (CM+) and four novel (NM+);
N = 8 negatively valenced metaphors, four conventional (CM−)
and four novel (NM-), in their first premise. Table 1 presents
an example of argument translated into English for each middle
term condition.
The set of arguments also included 12 literal arguments as
fillers: four clearly weak literal arguments, four clearly strong
literal arguments, and four literal arguments with plausible
conclusions (see Table A3 in Appendix for the literal arguments
in Italian).
Procedure
The data was collected through an online form. After the
participants signed the informed consent, the form gathered
information about gender, age, language, and education.
Participants were then asked to read the instructions and
complete two practice trials to familiarize themselves with the
task. The syllogisms were then randomly presented, followed
by some questions. After each argument, the following question
appeared: “Does the conclusion follow from the premises?,”
asking the participants to answer “Yes” or “No.” Participants
were then asked to rate the arguments on a 1–5 Likert scale
(1 = least likely, 5 = most likely), answering the questions
for the measures: (1) Understandability; (2) Convincingness; (3)
Emotional appeal; (4) Logical relation; (5) Ambiguity; (6) Belief
in the conclusion; (7) Real-world experience. The experiment
lasted 30 min ca.
Results
All the data collected are available at the following OSF
address https://osf.io/jzpva/?view_only=8edc3b523cbb4afba4bd
71978d847a48. Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) for
accuracy are presented in Table 2. First of all, we checked
whether the participants correctly answered in the case of literal
arguments, to understand whether they carefully performed the
task and whether they have a basic ability in detecting clearly
strong and clearly weak arguments. The participants performed
almost at ceiling for all literal arguments. The Chi-squared
test showed that the participants provided significantly more
correct than incorrect answers to literal arguments (p < 0.001;
LS: χ2 = 134.00, ϕ = 0.86; LW: χ2 = 102.34, ϕ = 0.75; LP:
χ2 = 57.36, ϕ = 0.56). A series of paired t-tests suggested that
fallacious literal arguments with plausible conclusions were more
difficult to detect when compared to both clearly strong (p <
0.001) and clearly weak arguments (p < 0.01).
The Chi-squared test showed that participants provided more
incorrect than correct answers to arguments withmetaphors (p<
0.001; CM0: χ2 = 76.43, ϕ = 0.65; CM+: χ2 = 69.24, ϕ = 0.62;
CM−: χ2 = 99.98, ϕ = 0.74; NM0: χ2 = 28.45, ϕ = 0.40; NM+:
χ2 = 51.65, ϕ = 0.53; NM-: χ2 = 51.86, ϕ = 0.53). A two-
way ANOVA was performed for accuracy to assess the main
effects of the metaphorical and affective middle term type and the
interaction of the two factors on the evaluation of the fallacious
arguments. The results of themain effects are reported inTable 3.
Overall, the results showed a significant main effect of the
metaphorical type [F(1, 89) = 29.30; p < 0.001; η
2
= 0.05] and
the affective type [F(2, 88) = 4.63; p = 0.01; η
2
= 0.016], but no
significant interaction of the metaphorical type and the affective
type [F(2, 86) = 1.65; p = 0.192; η
2
= 0.006] on participant’s
evaluation of the arguments. The significant main effect of
the metaphorical type is due to the lower number of correct
answers in the case of arguments with conventional metaphors
when compared to arguments with novel metaphors. A post-hoc
Tukey’s test, corrected for multiple comparisons, was performed
to determine the statistical significance of the difference between
specific affective conditions (see Table 4 for all the results). The
post-hoc analysis revealed that the significant main effect of the
affective type is due to the lower number of correct answers
in the case of arguments with negatively valenced metaphors
when compared to arguments with non-emotive metaphors
[t(89) = 0.32; p < 0.01].
We analyzed the answers provided by the participants on
different possible factors influencing the arguments’ evaluation
(see M and SD values for each measure in Table 5). A multiple
linear regression analysis was performed on the data: separate
linear models were created for 3 “affective framing” conditions
× 2 “metaphorical framing” conditions for both “yes” and “no”
responses. Table 6 presents the results of the linear regression for
all middle term conditions.
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TABLE 3 | Main effects of metaphorical and affective middle term type for accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2.
Accuracy (Experiment 1) Accuracy (Experiment 2)
SS df F P η2 f SS df F p η2 f
C (Metaphorical) 1.9 1 29.30 <0.001 0.05 0.23 0.0 1 0.01 0.91 0.00 0.08
C (Affective) 0.6 2 4.63 0.01 0.016 0.13 5.6 2 2.11 0.12 0.007 0.01
C (Metaphorical): C(Affective) 0.2 2 1.65 0.192 0.006 0.08 20.9 2 7.89 <0.001 0.027 0.17
SS, Sum of squares; df, degrees of freedom; η2, Eta squared (small: η2 = 0.01; medium: η2 = 0.059; large: η2 = 0.138); f, Cohen’s effect size (small: f = 0.1, medium: f = 0.25, large:
f = 0.4).
TABLE 4 | t/p-values for accuracy, comparing middle term affective conditions
(Experiment 1).
Comparisons t p
C (Affective) neutral/negative 0.32 <0.01
positive/negative 0.18 0.19
positive/neutral −0.13 0.40
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict “yes”
and “no” based on understandability, convincingness, emotional
appeal, logical relation, ambiguity, belief in the conclusion and
real world experience for novel and conventional metaphors.
When “yes” was predicted it was found that seven predictors in
positive (β = 0.06, p < 0.05), negative (β = 0.66, p < 0.05),
and non-emotive (β = 0.12, p < 0.05) metaphorical middle term
conditions were significant predictors in the case of conventional
metaphors. The overall model fit for positive metaphor was
R2 = 0.64, for negative metaphor was R2 = 0.33 and non-
emotive metaphors was R2 = 0.65. When “yes” was predicted it
was found that six predictors in positive (β = 0.09, p < 0.05),
negative (β = 0.24, p < 0.05), and non-emotive (β = 0.14, p
< 0.05) metaphorical middle term conditions were significant
predictors in the case of novel metaphors. The overall model
fit for positive metaphor was R2 = 0.05, for negative metaphor
was R2 = 0.47 and non-emotive metaphor was R2 = 0.55. When
“no” was predicted it was found that seven predictors in positive
(β = −0.02, p < 0.05), negative (β = 0.22, p < 0.05), and
non-emotive (β = 0.07, p < 0.05) metaphorical middle term
conditions were significant predictors in the case of conventional
metaphors. The overall model fit for positive metaphor was
R2 = 0.14, for negative metaphor was R2 = 0.31 and non-emotive
metaphors was R2 = 0.27. When “no” was predicted it was found
that six predictors in positive (β = 0.26, p < 0.05), negative
(β = −0.02, p < 0.05), and non-emotive (β = 0.17, p < 0.05)
metaphorical middle term conditions were significant predictors
in the case of novel metaphors. The overall model fit for positive
metaphor was R2 = 0.27, for negative metaphor was R2 = 0.16
and non-emotive metaphor was R2 = 0.07.
The results showed that understandability was a significant
predictor for both accepting and discarding the conclusion of the
argument as following from the premises with both conventional
and novel metaphors. When the conclusion was perceived
to be following from the premises, for any argument with
emotive metaphors, both convincingness and emotional appeal
were significant predictors for committing the equivocation
fallacy [Convincingness: CM+ (t(89) = 2.11; p < 0.05), CM−
(t(89) = 1.79; p < 0.05), NM+ (t(89) = 2.11; p < 0.01),
and NM- (t(89) = 2.97; p < 0.01); Emotional appeal: CM+
(t(89) = 2.27; p < 0.01), CM− (t(89) = 2.35; p < 0.01),
NM+ (t(89) = 2.67; p < 0.05), and NM- (t(89) = 3.14; p <
0.001)]. Emotional appeal was a significant predictor also in
the case of novel non-emotive metaphors (t(89) = 2.19; p <
0.01). Interestingly, in the case of negatively valenced metaphors,
also the perception of having found a logical relation in the
argument and the belief in the conclusion, independent from the
premises, were significant predictors for accepting the plausible
conclusion [Logical relation: CM− (t(89) = 2.19; p < 0.01),
NM - (t(89) = 2.54; p < 0.01); Belief in the conclusion: CM−
(t(89) = 2.81; p < 0.001), NM- (t(89) = 3.44; p < 0.001)].
The perception of a logical relation was a significant predictor
in the case of CM+ arguments (t(89) = 2.14; p < 0.01), but
not in the case of CM0 arguments. In the case of arguments
with positively valenced metaphors, the belief in the conclusion
was not a significant predictor for committing the equivocation
fallacy, while it was significant in the case of NM0 arguments
(t(89) = 2.46; p < 0.001).
When the conclusion was seen not to be following from
the premises, ambiguity was a significant predictor for all the
arguments featuring novel metaphors [NM0 (t(89) = 2.17; p <
0.01), NM+ (t(89) = 2.89; p < 0.05), and NM- (t(89) = 2.14; p
< 0.05)], independent of their valence. In the case of negatively
valenced metaphors, both ambiguity and convincingness were
significant predictors for detecting the equivocation fallacy
[Ambiguity: CM− (t(89) = 3.92; p < 0.05), NM- (t(89) = 2.14;
p < 0.05); Convincingness: CM− (t(89) = 2.79; p < 0.05), NM-
(t(89) = 2.47; p < 0.05)]. In the case of positively valenced
metaphors, emotional appeal was a significant predictor for
detecting the equivocation fallacy [Emotional appeal: CM+
(t(89) = 3.14; p < 0.01), NM+ (t(89) = 2.19; p < 0.05)]. In the
case of non-emotive metaphors, having found a logical relation
between premises and conclusion and real-world experience of
similar arguments were significant predictors for detecting the
fallacy [Logical relation: CM0 (t(89) = 3.41; p < 0.001), NM0
(t(89) = 3.46; p< 0.05); Real world experience: CM0 (t(89) = 3.44;
p < 0.05), NM0 (t(89) = 3.47; p < 0.05)].
Discussion
The results of the Chi-squared test confirmed that participants
mostly fail in the evaluation of syllogisms with metaphors
and plausible conclusions (Ervas et al., 2018). The significant
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TABLE 5 | Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) values of each predictor for each middle term condition (Experiment 1).
Predictor CM+ CM- CM0 NM+ NM- NM0
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Understandability 3.23 0.66 3.57 0.66 3.21 0.67 2.92 0.80 3.00 0.67 2.51 0.67
Convincingness 3.01 0.65 3.38 0.70 2.99 0.77 2.63 0.85 2.64 0.72 2.27 0.84
Emotional appeal 2.33 0.82 2.50 0.80 2.34 0.78 2.49 0.99 2.30 0.79 1.49 0.55
Logical relation 3.11 0.75 3.45 0.71 3.24 0.81 2.89 0.84 2.92 0.78 2.55 0.76
Ambiguity 2.27 0.75 1.89 0.63 2.25 0.80 2.46 0.91 2.52 0.78 2.84 0.89
Belief in the conclusion 3.18 0.67 3.48 0.76 3.11 0.77 2.81 0.92 2.94 0.86 2.56 0.77
Real world experience 2.85 0.82 3.20 0.86 2.93 0.89 2.75 0.99 2.84 0.85 1.96 0.83
Positively valenced (CM+), negatively valenced (CM-), non-emotive (CM0) conventional metaphor. Positively valenced (NM+), negatively valenced (NM-), non-emotive (NM0)
novel metaphor.
TABLE 6 | t/p-values for each predictor in the evaluation of arguments, comparing the middle term conditions (Experiment 1).
Conventional metaphor Novel metaphor
Answer Predictors Positive Negative Non-emotive Positive Negative Non-emotive


















β t β t β t β t β t β t
Understandability 0.51 2.17** 0.22 3.43** 0.33 3.21* 0.41 1.09 0.44 3.14** 0.33 3.15*
Convincingness 0.32 2.11* 0.27 1.79* 0.08 1.16 0.22 2.11** 0.35 2.97** 0.11 2.62
Emotional appeal 0.22 2.27** 0.34 2.35** 0.11 1.72 0.44 2.67* 0.57 3.14*** 0.43 2.19**
Logical relation 0.41 2.14** 0.33 2.19** 0.19 1.53 0.32 2.11 0.46 2.54** 0.44 2.22*
Ambiguity 0.17 2.7 0.13 2.66 0.21 2.72 0.08 2.17 0.52 2.19** 0.17 1.76
Belief in the conclusion 0.21 2.31 0.45 2.81*** 0.12 1.65 0.04 2.12 0.71 3.44*** 0.61 2.46**
Real world experience 0.32 2.19* 0.32 2.72 0.07 2.61 0.06 2.97 0.12 1.93 0.15 2.71


















β t β t β t β t β t β t
Understandability 0.19 2.1 0.56 3.41** 0.56 3.17*** 0.32 3.16** 0.42 1.96** 0.51 2.45**
Convincingness 0.11 2.71 0.43 2.79* 0.06 1.19 0.11 1.8 0.36 2.47* 0.10 2.71
Emotional appeal 0.36 3.14** 0.21 1.16 0.15 3.32 0.25 2.19* 0.10 2.96 0.32 2.27*
Logical relation 0.17 2.76 0.11 1.88 0.66 3.41*** 0.22 1.14 0.22 3.27 0.46 3.46*
Ambiguity 0.11 1.16 0.34 3.92* 0.12 3.11 0.27 2.89* 0.40 2.14* 0.50 2.17**
Belief in the conclusion 0.09 3.5* 0.20 2.18 0.14 2.12 0.09 1.18 0.13 2.96 0.10 2.24
Real world experience 0.05 2.18 0.21 1.67 0.38 3.44* 0.11 2.92 0.06 2.74 0.39 3.47*
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
main effect of the metaphor type of the middle term on the
evaluation of the arguments suggests that participants are more
prone to commit the metaphoric fallacy when a conventional
metaphor occurs in the first premise. This effect is independent
of whether conventional metaphors are based on an emotive
vehicle or not, and it can be explained by the metaphorical
interference effect (MIE) (Glucksberg et al., 1982) in the truth
evaluation of the first premise. When reading the premise
with a conventional metaphor, we can assign it intuitive truth
conditions, even though it is literally false. In a contextualist
pragmatic perspective (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002;
Recanati, 2004, 2010), we understand the premise when we know
the concrete circumstances of truth, which can depart from their
literal ones. Processes of lexical modulation are supposed to
adjust the literal meaning of the sentence and to provide an
“adjusted” meaning, better fitting the context. This is also the
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case of conventional metaphors, whose vehicle encodes a source
concept that is contextually modulated to generate an ad hoc
concept in the proposition the speaker intends to communicate
(Carston, 1997, 2002), corresponding to the intuitive truth-
conditions she assigned. Diverging from the predictions of
classical argumentation, we commit the metaphoric fallacy
because we systematically and unawarely reject the “literal” truth
conditions in the pragmatic process of conventional metaphor
understanding, thus compromising the evaluation of the strength
of the overall argument (Ervas et al., 2015).
Another route to metaphor understanding is followed when
understanding novel metaphors (Carston, 2010, 2018). Especially
in the case of unfamiliar and novel metaphors, the literal meaning
of the vehicle would linger in the interpretation process of
the premise, possibly requiring more contextual information
to be intuitively perceived as true (Indurkhya, 2006, 2016;
Carston, 2010; Ervas, 2019). However, the sentential context
of the first premise, as well as the narrow syllogistic context
of argumentation, would make novel metaphors’ interpretation
more easily recognized as false when compared to conventional
metaphors. In a sense, novel (rather than conventional)
metaphors are processed in a Gricean style in the first premise
of the syllogism, as they are recognized from the very beginning
as “patently false.” As there is a strict link between the truth
conditions of the premises and the evaluation of the strength
of the whole argument, it would be easier for participants to
detect the metaphoric fallacy in the case of novel metaphors.
Also, the suppression mechanism of the literal meaning should
be more difficult in novel rather than in conventional metaphors
interpretation (Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher et al.,
2001; Rubio Fernandez, 2007). This would be crucial for the
detection of a fallacy based on the equivocation between the
metaphorical and the literal meaning of the middle term.
Participants recognized ambiguity as a reason for rejecting the
argument as unsound in all the cases of arguments with novel
metaphors, independently of their emotive valence.
The significant main effect of the affective type of the middle
term on the evaluation of the arguments and the post-hoc analysis’
results suggest that participants are more prone to commit the
metaphoric fallacy when a negatively valenced rather than a
non-emotive metaphor occurs in the first premise. This effect
is independent of whether the metaphors are conventional or
novel and confirms previous studies on the effect of emotions
on deductive reasoning: even though the validity of a conclusion
should not depend on the emotional valence of the premises, it
has been shown that negatively valenced contents are associated
with decreased logicality compared to neutral contents (Lefford,
1946; Blanchette and Richards, 2004; Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette
and Leese, 2011). Beyond confirming that the affective valence
of the content influences normatively correct answers when
reasoning about syllogisms, the results seem to confirm also
the idea of a general negative effect of emotions on cognitive
performance [see e.g., Lieberman et al. (2005)]. The answers
provided by the participants to the seven questions - following
the main question on the argument strength - let us better
understand why participants were more prone to accept the
metaphoric fallacy as sound in the case of emotive metaphors.
When participants accepted the metaphoric fallacy as sound, its
emotional appeal and convincingness had a crucial role, while
the logical structure and real-life experience played a major role
in the case of non-emotive metaphors, i.e., when participants
did detect the metaphoric fallacy. However, emotional appeal is
also a significant predictor for detecting the metaphoric fallacy
in the case of positively valenced metaphor: this suggests that
the positive valence of the metaphorical middle term might
increase participants’ logicality, thus questioning the idea that
emotional content always undermines cognitive performance in
reasoning tasks.
The absence of a significant interaction between the metaphor
type and the affective type of the middle term suggests that
the metaphorical framing and the affective framing might act
independently. Nonetheless, when the affective values of the
vehicle and the topic are coherent, both effects are in place
in the evaluation of arguments featuring the metaphor. On
the one hand, especially in the case of conventional metaphor,
the metaphorical framing could have been covert (Thibodeau
and Boroditsky, 2011, 2015) and thus more influential in
guiding the participants to make evaluations consistent with
the metaphorical heuristic rather than with logicality (Robins
and Mayer, 2000). On the other hand, especially in the case of
negatively valenced metaphors, the affective framing might have
led participants to derail from the route to logicality, embracing
heuristics when reasoning (Eliades et al., 2013). Previous research
has argued in favor of the thesis that “emotions promote a form
of reasoning which is less analytical and more heuristic-based”
(Blanchette et al., 2018, p. 61), especially when the arguments
are susceptible to the biasing effects of conclusion believability
(Eliades et al., 2012). The results of the experiment confirm
that, especially in the case of negatively valenced metaphors,
participants’ belief in the conclusion significantly leads them
to accept the metaphoric fallacy as a sound argument, even
thinking of having found a logical relation between premises
and conclusion. However, controversial results on the influence
of negatively valenced emotional content in reasoning can be
found within the literature (Hofmann et al., 2009;MacKuen et al.,
2010): it might be claimed that not necessarily the influence
of negatively valenced stimuli leads participants to make more
“errors.” Negatively valenced emotional content might have led
the participants to find alternative reasons, regardless of their
logical validity or of the argument strength, thus reinterpreting
the premises of the arguments with metaphors to make sense of
the believed conclusion. In this perspective, a global process of
sense-making would have precedence over the analytic process
in the evaluation of the “metaphoric fallacy” and lead the
(re)interpretation of the overall argument as metaphorical.
Experiment 2
The goal of the experiment was to test the evaluation of
metaphoric fallacies, having a syllogistic form and - in their first
premise - an emotive metaphor, whose vehicle has an emotional
meaning incoherent with the emotional meaning of the topic.
We aimed to understand whether the emotional meaning of the
overall sentential metaphorical context of the first premise or the
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TABLE 7 | Examples of arguments in English for each middle term condition (Experiment 2).
Non-emotive metaphors (0) Positively valenced metaphors (+) Negatively valenced metaphors (-)
CM [P1] That girl is a gem. (gemma)
[P2] A gem is a precious stone.
[C] That girl is a precious stone.
[P1] A separation is a thaw. (schiarita)
[P2] A thaw is the defreezing of ice.
[C] A separation is the defreezing of ice.
[P1] Bravery is a scar. (sfregio)
[P2] A scar is a wound.
[C] Bravery is a wound.
NM [P1] The rooster is a pharaoh. (faraone)
[P2] A pharaoh is a leader.
[C] The rooster is a leader.
[P1] Insolence is a smile. (risata)
[P2] A smile is an expression of joy.
[C] Insolence is an expression of joy.
[P1] Religion is a scald. (ustione)
[P2] A scald is a serious burn.
[C] Religion is a serious burn.
specific emotional meaning of the vehicle as middle term leads
the participants to accept a fallacious argument as sound.
Participants
The participants (99 adults, 69 women, 33 men) were
undergraduate students in Communication Science recruited at
the University of Cagliari, had Italian as their first language,
and normal/corrected vision. As in the first experiment, we
checked for the participants’ intuitive answers on different
measures concerning the acceptability of argument conclusions,
and excluded participants (N = 3) who had advanced training in
logic and/or argumentation theory, resulting in 96 participants
(63 women, 33 men,Mage = 23.90 years, SDage = 8.39 years).
Materials
Participants were presented with a set of N = 36 arguments
in Italian (Table A2 in Appendix), including the 12 literal
arguments-fillers presented in the first experiment (Table A3
in Appendix). The arguments had the structure of syllogisms
with plausible conclusions and contained N = 8 non-emotive
metaphors, 4 CM0 and 4 NM0; N = 8 positively valenced
metaphors, 4 CM+ and 4 NM+; N = 8 negatively valenced
metaphors, 4 CM− and 4 NM-, in their first premise. Table 7
presents an example argument for each middle term condition.
The set of syllogisms with non-emotive metaphors was the
same as used in the first study, and the set of syllogisms
with emotive metaphors had the same second premises of
the syllogisms as in the first study. The emotive metaphors
had the same metaphor vehicles as middle terms of the
syllogisms, but different metaphor topics when compared to the
emotive metaphors used in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, the
emotive metaphors in the first premises of the syllogisms were
emotionally incoherent. Consequently, the conclusions differed
from the conclusions of the syllogisms in Experiment 1, because
they connect different metaphor topics to the last term of each
second premise. Still, the evaluation of the syllogisms depends on
the same middle terms, which are the metaphor vehicles.
Procedure
We collected the data through an online form, where all
the participants signed their informed consent and provided
information about their gender, age, language, and education.
We followed the same procedure used in Experiment 1, asking
participants to read the instructions, complete the practice
block and to evaluate the randomly presented arguments. For
each argument, the participants were asked to evaluate whether
TABLE 8 | Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) values of correct answers for
each middle term condition (Experiment 2).
Positively Negatively Non-emotive
valenced valenced
M SD M SD M SD
CM 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.15 0.26
NM 0.28 0.32 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.27
Literal Strong Weak Arguments with
arguments arguments plausible conclusion
0.97 0.10 0.89 0.21 0.80 0.24
the conclusion of the argument followed from the premises
(“Yes” or “No” answers) and to rate the arguments on a
1–5 Likert scale (1 = least likely, 5 = most likely), based
on the answers to the measures: (1) Understandability; (2)
Convincingness; (3) Emotional appeal; (4) Logical relation;
(5) Ambiguity; (6) Belief in the conclusion; (7) Real-world
experience. Participants employed ca. 30min to complete
the experiment.
Results
All the data collected are available at the following
OSF address (https://osf.io/jzpva/?view_only=
8edc3b523cbb4afba4bd71978d847a48). Mean and standard
deviation for accuracy are presented in Table 8. We first checked
whether the participants correctly answered the fillers, i.e., the
literal arguments, to understand whether they actually have
a basic ability in detecting clearly strong vs. weak arguments.
As in the first experiment, the participants performed almost
at ceiling in evaluating literal arguments. The Chi-squared
test suggested that they provided significantly more correct
than incorrect answers to literal arguments (p < 0.001; LS:
χ2 = 140.29, ϕ = 0.85; LW: χ2 = 95.41, ϕ = 0.70; LP:
χ2 = 62.00, φ =0.57). We performed paired t-tests between
literal arguments with plausible conclusions and clearly strong
vs. weak literal arguments: the results suggested that fallacious
arguments with plausible conclusions were more difficult to
detect when compared to both clearly strong (p < 0.001)
and clearly weak arguments (p < 0.01). The Chi-squared test
also suggested that participants provided more incorrect than
correct answers to arguments with metaphors (p < 0.001; CM0:
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TABLE 9 | t/p-values for accuracy, comparing middle term conditions (Experiment
2).
Comparisons t p
C(Metaphorical): C (Affective) CM0/CM- middle terms −0.60 0.004
CM+/CM- middle terms −0.29 0.49
NM-/CM- middle terms −0.52 0.02
NM0/CM- middle terms −0.25 0.66
NM+/CM- middle terms −0.093 0.99
CM+/CM0 middle terms 0.31 0.41
NM-/CM0 middle terms 0.08 0.99
NM0/CM0 middle terms 0.35 0.27
NM+/CM0 middle terms 0.51 0.02
NM-/CM+ middle terms −0.22 0.73
NM0/CM+ middle terms 0.04 0.99
NM+/CM+ middle terms 0.19 0.84
NM0/NM- middle terms 0.27 0.57
NM+/NM- middle terms 0.42 0.10
NM+/NM0 middle terms 0.15 0.93
Positively valenced (CM+), negatively valenced (CM-), non-emotive (CM0) conventional
metaphor. Positively valenced (NM+), negatively valenced (NM-), non-emotive (NM0)
novel metaphor.
χ2 = 81.91, ϕ = 0.65; CM+: χ2 = 52.76, ϕ = 0.52; CM−:
χ2 = 40.48, ϕ = 0.46; NM0: χ2 = 44.50, ϕ = 0.48; NM+:
χ2 = 47.35, ϕ = 0.50; NM-: χ2 = 67.50, ϕ = 0.59).
A two-way ANOVA was performed for accuracy, to evaluate
the main effects of the metaphorical and affective middle term
type and the effect of their interaction on the evaluation of the
fallacious arguments. The results of the main effects are reported
in Table 3, comparing them to the results of the first experiment.
Differently from the first experiment, the ANOVA results showed
no significant main effects of the metaphorical [F(1, 94) = 0.01;
p = 0.91; η2 = 0.00] and affective [F(2, 93) = 2.11; p = 0.12;
η2 = 0.007]middle term type, but instead a significant interaction
effect between them [F(2, 91) = 7.89; p < 0.001; η
2
= 0.027]. A
Tukey’s test, corrected for multiple comparisons, was performed
to assess the statistical significance of the interaction effect (see
Table 9 for all the results). The post-hoc analysis revealed a higher
level of accuracy especially in the evaluation of CM− arguments,
when compared to both CM0 arguments [t(94) = 0.60; p= 0.004]
and NM- arguments [t(94) = 0.52; p = 0.02]. Furthermore, it
showed a significant difference between the level of accuracy
in the evaluation of NM+ arguments when compared to CM0
arguments, which received less correct answers [t(94) = 0.51; p
= 0.02].
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict “yes”
and “no” based on understandability, convincingness, emotional
appeal, logical relation, ambiguity, belief in the conclusion and
real world experience for novel and conventional metaphors (see
M and SD values for eachmeasure inTable 10).Table 11 presents
the results of the linear regression for all middle term conditions.
When “yes” was predicted it was found that four predictors in
positive (β = 0.16, p < 0.05), negative (β = 0.44, p < 0.05),
and non-emotive (β = 0.37, p < 0.05) metaphorical middle term
conditions were significant predictors in the case of conventional
metaphors. The overall model fit for positive metaphor was
R2 = 0.24, for negative metaphor was R2 = 0.21 and non-emotive
metaphors was R2 = 0.25. When “yes” was predicted it was found
that seven predictors in positive (β = 0.11, p < 0.05), negative
(β = 0.27, p < 0.05), and non-emotive (β = 0.27, p < 0.05)
metaphorical middle term conditions were significant predictors
in the case of novel metaphors. The overall model fit for positive
metaphor was R2 = 0.07, for negative metaphor was R2 = 0.24
and non-emotive metaphors was R2 = 0.35. When “no” was
predicted it was found that four predictors in positive (β = 0.19,
p < 0.001), negative (β = 0.12, p < 0.01), and non-emotive
(β = 0.13, p < 0.05) metaphorical middle term conditions were
significant predictors in the case of conventional metaphors.
The overall model fit for positive metaphor was R2 = 0.04, for
negative metaphor was R2 = 0.41 and non-emotive metaphors
was R2 = 0.17. When “no” was predicted it was found that seven
predictors in positive (β = 0.16, p < 0.05), negative (β = −0.07,
p < 0.05), and non-emotive (β = 0.07, p < 0.05) metaphorical
middle term conditions were significant predictors in the case of
novel metaphors. The overall model fit for positive metaphor was
R2 = 0.13, for negative metaphor was R2 = 0.11 and non-emotive
metaphor was R2 = 0.19.
As in the first experiment, the results of the linear regression
showed that understandability was a significant predictor for
both accepting and discarding the conclusion of the argument
as following from the premises in both conventional and novel
metaphors. When the conclusion was seen to be following
from the premises, for any argument with conventional emotive
metaphor, both convincingness and emotional appeal were
significant predictors for committing the equivocation fallacy
[Convincingness: CM+ (t(94) = 3.2; p < 0.01), CM− (t(94) = 3.4;
p < 0.05); Emotional appeal: CM+ (t(94) = 2.7; p < 0.05),
CM− (t(94) = 1.96; p < 0.05)]. Convincingness was also a
significant predictor for committing the fallacy in the case of
CM0 arguments (t(94) = 3.71; p < 0.05). Emotional appeal was
also a significant predictor for accepting the fallacious argument
in the case of NM- arguments (t(94) = 2.01; p < 0.01), as well
as the perception of having found a logical relation between
premises and conclusion (t(94) = 3.77; p < 0.05) and some
ambiguity in the argument (t(94) = 1.9; p < 0.01). In the case
of NM0 arguments, having found a logical relation between
premises and conclusion (t(94) = 3.79; p < 0.01) and real-world
experience of similar arguments (t(94) = 2.7; p < 0.05) were
significant predictors for committing the fallacy. Interestingly,
the belief in the conclusion was a significant predictor in the
case of arguments with negatively valenced metaphors [CM−
(t(94) = 1.91; p < 0.001), NM- (t(94) = 2.7; p < 0.05)].
When the conclusion was detected as not following from
the premises, convincingness was a significant predictor in
the case of arguments with negatively valenced metaphors
[CM− (t(94) = 2.4; p < 0.01), NM- (t(94) = 2.71; p <
0.05)]. Logical relation was significant predictor for detecting
the metaphoric fallacy in the case of CM+ (t(94) = 2.22; p <
0.001), CM0 (t(94) = 2.41; p < 0.01) and NM0 (t(94) = 2.4;
p < 0.01) arguments. Ambiguity and emotional appeal were
instead significant predictor for detecting the metaphoric fallacy
in the case of positively valenced novel metaphors [Ambiguity:
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TABLE 10 | Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) values of each predictor for each middle term condition (Experiment 2).
Predictor CM+ CM- CM0 NM+ NM- NM0
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Understandability 2.91 0.77 2.52 0.78 3.48 0.76 2.78 0.74 3.08 0.78 2.77 0.81
Convincingness 2.42 0.64 2.04 0.68 3.14 0.72 2.25 0.61 2.76 0.62 2.27 0.76
Emotional appeal 1.92 0.75 1.51 0.57 2.29 0.79 1.95 0.72 1.85 0.70 1.49 0.47
Logical relation 2.86 0.70 2.53 0.76 3.23 0.72 2.61 0.69 2.98 0.71 2.69 0.74
Ambiguity 2.35 0.62 2.60 0.71 2.13 0.70 2.40 0.72 2.20 0.61 2.51 0.76
Belief in the conclusion 2.41 0.70 1.93 0.64 3.23 0.73 2.20 0.68 2.64 0.71 2.51 0.77
Real world experience 2.33 0.89 1.90 0.80 3.04 0.84 2.19 0.79 2.58 0.88 2.07 0.87
Positively valenced (CM+), negatively valenced (CM-), non-emotive (CM0) conventional metaphor. Positively valenced (NM+), negatively valenced (NM-), non-emotive (NM0)
novel metaphor.
TABLE 11 | t/p-values for each predictor in the evaluation of arguments, comparing the middle term conditions (Experiment 2).
Conventional metaphor Novel metaphor
Answer Predictors Positive Negative Non-emotive Positive Negative Non-emotive


















β t β t β t β t β t β t
Understandability 0.33 2.91* 0.34 2.29** 0.29 2.51* 0.55 3.15*** 0.47 2.66** 0.57 2.97*
Convincingness 0.29 3.2** 0.22 3.4* 0.33 3.71* 0.43 2.72** 0.55 3.61* 0.30 3.1
Emotional appeal 0.22 2.7* 0.09 1.96* 0.21 2.66 0.20 2.37* 0.48 2.01** 0.08 1.6
Logical relation 0.20 1.47 0.21 1.15 0.07 2.42 0.11 1.18 0.44 3.77* 0.31 3.79**
Ambiguity 0.32 2.51 0.17 2.9 0.12 2.01 0.09 2.91 0.53 1.9** 0.04 1.46
Belief in the conclusion 0.17 2.33 0.67 1.91*** 0.11 3.07 0.07 2.12 0.40 2.7* 0.05 2.1
Real world experience 0.11 1.56 0.22 1.41 0.20 2.4 0.13 2.11 0.21 1.9 0.24 2.7*


















β t β t β T β t β t β t
Understandability 0.24 1.4 0.36 2.74** 0.33 3.47*** 0.76 3.04** 0.30 2.01** 0.41 2.97**
Convincingness 0.09 2.72 0.29 2.4** 0.14 2.07 0.10 1.14 0.21 2.71* 0.11 3.41
Emotional appeal 0.19 2.47 0.31 2.8 0.19 2.11 0.36 2.9* 0.06 1.13 0.15 3.07
Logical relation 0.57 2.22*** 0.09 1.61 0.41 2.41** 0.09 1.8 0.03 1.71 0.28 2.4**
Ambiguity 0.22 1.91 0.11 2.11 0.22 3.53 0.28 2.17* 0.17 1.72 0.09 2.02
Belief in the conclusion 0.19 1.71 0.27 2.34 0.05 1.17 0.07 2.44 0.29 2.7* 0.30 1.26
Real world experience 0.07 1.01 0.07 2.02 0.37 1.21* 0.10 2.21 0.47 3.4 0.28 2.48*
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
t(94) = 2.17; p < 0.05; Emotional appeal: t(94) = 2.9; p < 0.05].
Real world experience of similar arguments was a significant
predictor in the case of arguments with non-emotive metaphors
[CM0: t(94) = 1.21; p < 0.05, NM0: t(94) = 2.48; p < 0.05] and
negatively valenced novel metaphors (t(94) = 3.4; p < 0.01).
Discussion
The results confirm that participants mostly fail in the evaluation
of the metaphoric fallacy. However, they suggest that the affective
valence of the overall metaphor, rather than the vehicle alone
as middle term, influences the detection of the metaphoric
fallacy. When the first premise is affectively incoherent and more
difficult to make sense of, neither the metaphorical nor the
affective framing significantly influence participants’ evaluation.
This suggests that the initial incoherence of the arguments make
participants abandon the global heuristic process at work in both
metaphorical and affective framing in arguments’ assessment.
As suggested in argumentation theory by Walton (1996), the
metaphoric fallacy is a special kind of equivocation fallacy
where a global process of metaphorical interpretation is in place,
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differing from the mere process of disambiguation required
by literal middle terms in the detection of the equivocation
fallacy. A global interpretation would involve an evaluation
of the overall first premise featuring the metaphor, including
both the topic and the vehicle. Global aspects prevailed when
participants committed the fallacy: the emotional appeal and the
convincingness of the argument in the case of emotive metaphors
and, as in the first experiment, the belief in the conclusion when
assessing syllogisms with negatively valenced metaphors.
When it is more difficult to make sense of the affective
incoherence of themetaphor in the first premise, themetaphorical
and the affective framing interact, increasing participants’
logicality not only in the case of novel positively valenced
metaphors (compared to conventional non-emotive metaphors),
but also in the case of conventional negatively valenced
metaphors (compared to conventional non-emotive and novel
negatively valenced metaphors). More correct answers are
provided in those conditions, suggesting a more nuanced picture,
where emotive metaphors do not have the usual deleterious
role in reasoning. In the case of NM+ arguments, participants
detected the ambiguity of the fallacy, and in the case of CM−,
participants checked for the convincingness of the argument
itself, without being affected by the believability of the conclusion
(as in the case of NM- arguments). This suggests that the initial
incoherence of the arguments makes participants more vigilant
in specific and local cases where the type of metaphor and
its affective valence did play a role in avoiding the negative
consequences associated with endorsing unsound arguments.
Thus, a more analytical style of reasoning is embraced by the
participants: in the case of novel positively valenced metaphors,
the evident distance between the literal and the metaphorical
meaning is more easily detected; in the case of conventional
negatively valenced metaphors, the intention to convince the
participants make them more doubting and less likely to endorse
the believable but unsound conclusion. This more systematic
information processing style probably required the allocation
of extra attention and more cognitive resources (Forgas, 1995),
requiring to assess both the metaphorical and affective effects.
General Discussion
Both metaphors and emotions have been said to entail a negative
effect on reasoning. The studies highlight how the picture
is more complicated: not always the metaphorical framing
interacts with the affective framing leading to a decreased
logicality and not always a decreased logicality is justified by
a deleterious use of the heuristics entailed by the metaphorical
and the affective framing in reasoning. This could be explained
by dual-processing models [see e.g., Kahneman (2003), Evans
(2008), and Evans and Frankish (2009)], envisaging two distinct
inferential (automatic vs. controlled) processes: notoriously,
System 1 and System 2. The first includes quick associative,
emotional and heuristic processes working in a parallel, effortless
and unconscious way; the second includes slow rule-governed,
neutral and content-blind processes working in a serial, effortful
and often conscious way (Ervas et al., 2015). Metaphors can be
seen as heuristic, System 1-type processes that never guarantee
the preservation of truth in deductive reasoning tasks up to
System 2 (Fischer, 2014; Keefer and Landau, 2016), though
intuitively leading to genuinely new knowledge via a creative
argumentation style (Schn, 1993; Leung et al., 2012). In this
perspective, as pointed out by Haack (1994, p. 4), metaphors
can be seen as “cognitively vital” and illuminating, but “can
also be feeble; can be exploited to the purpose of persuading
by emotional appeal rather than rational argument.” As argued
in recent psychological literature (Citron and Goldberg, 2014,
p. 9), metaphors are “more emotionally engaging than literal
expressions,” especially when they are grounded in perceptual
and sensorimotor representations (Indurkhya, 1992, 1994; Gibbs,
2006), recalling people’s experiential knowledge rather than more
abstract and analytical constructs. In the same vein, emotions
have been said to elicit System 1-type processes, depleting
available cognitive resources at the expense of System 2, thus
affecting analytical reasoning and decreasing logicality to a
greater extent (Channon and Baker, 1994; Kensinger and Corkin,
2003; De Neys, 2012).
However, the relationship between System 1 and System
2 processes is largely understood in terms of competition or
conflict:embodiment plays a role only in heuristics and/or
emotional processes, while “proper” reasoning processes still
deserve a superior function of control and/or revision. From a
philosophical point of view, dual-processing models have been
criticized as proposing an anachronistic view of mind, having a
disembodied normative System 2 working in opposition to an
embodied System 1 (Marraffa, 2014). More recent “integrated”
dual-processing models offer an alternative view of reasoning,
based on the coordination rather than competition between
different inferential processes [see e.g., Moshman (2004), Mercier
and Sperber (2011), Carruthers (2011), Fletcher and Carruthers
(2012), Baumard and Boyer (2013), and Rossi (2014)]. From
a psychological point of view, it has been pointed out that
emotional heuristic processes are not always in contrast with
normatively-correct or analytical reasoning processes. A number
of studies showed that positive emotional content improves
performance on conditional and/or syllogistic reasoning (Isen
et al., 1987; Melton, 1995). Especially when this content is
relevant to the participants’ prior real-life experience and/or
their current emotional state (Blanchette, 2006; Johnson-Laird
et al., 2006; Blanchette et al., 2007; Blanchette and Campbell,
2012; Caparos and Blanchette, 2016), there is a reduction of
the classic belief bias effect on arguments’ evaluation in the
case of negative emotional content (Goel and Vartanian, 2011).
Rather than contraposing emotional and reasoning processes,
Blanchette et al. concluded that, depending on the emotional
relevance to the evaluator, the same emotional contentmight have
either an “incidental affect” (non-relevant) or a more “integral
affect” (relevant) on the reasoning task, respectively enhancing
the heuristic processes of System 1 and the analytical processes
of System 2 [Blanchette and Richards, 2010; Huntsinger, 2013;
Caparos and Blanchette, 2015; but see Jung et al. (2014) for
different results].
The present study shows that another element, affective
coherence, needs to be considered to have a more comprehensive
(but also more nuanced) view of the interaction between
emotional content and metaphorical (heuristic) processes and
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rule-governed (normative) processes. The comparison between
the main results of the first and the second experiments (Table 3)
suggests that affective coherence is crucial to understand the
main effects of the metaphor type and the affective type of
the middle term on the evaluation of the arguments, and their
interaction. When the first premises are affectively coherent
both the metaphorical and the affective framing significantly
influence the argument evaluation. However, when the first
premises are affectively incoherent, neither the metaphorical
nor the affective framing significantly influence the argument
evaluation. The results suggest that the affective coherence of the
vehicle and the topic is responsible for the emergence of both
the framing effects in the syllogisms’ evaluation. Different from
relevance, affective coherence concerns the emotional content
of the metaphor’s vehicle/topic, rather than the relationship
with the evaluators’ emotional state. The results suggest that
affective coherence is more basic and primitive than relevance,
determining the range of possible metaphorical and affective
framing effects and influencing the overall participants’ attempt
tomake sense of the argument. Affective coherence has an impact
on the early stages of semantic sentence processing, automatically
influencing sense-making (Schauenburg et al., 2019). Other
studies showed that affective coherence also leads to better
recall of the content (Richards and Gross, 1999), serving “as
evidence of the appropriateness of affective concepts that come to
mind” (Centerbar et al., 2008, p. 560). The condition of affective
coherence induces “affective certainty” (Tamir et al., 2002), which
“allow participants to devote themselves fully to the task at hand”
(Clore and Schnall, 2008, p. 3).
The results of the experiments also suggest that, for reasoning
with emotive metaphors, affective coherence promotes more
holistic, global and heuristic processes when both metaphorical
framing and affective framing contribute to creatively make sense
of the overall argument, diverging to strict normative rules of
logic in the metaphoric fallacy evaluation. However, affective
incoherence makes global processes of sense-making more
difficult to be carried out, neutralizing both general metaphorical
and affective framing effects and improving logicality in local
and analytical processes, where the framing effects interact to get
rid of ambiguity or the believability of the conclusion, usually
deviating normative reasoning. The direct emotional impact
comes first (Zajonc, 1980) and determines the attitudes toward
what is coming next (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986b; Petty and
Briñol, 2015) and the reasoning style of the evaluator: affective
coherent representations make participants more certain and
prone to read/listen to what may be coming next, while
affective incoherent representations make participants more
dubious and vigilant toward possible rule violations. Affective
incoherence vs. coherence draw us to play two different games
in reasoning with emotive metaphors, which could be called
respectively the “doubting game” and the “believing game”
(Elbow, 1998). The doubting game questions previous beliefs and
preconceptions, especially when self-evident, as well as “systems
of commonplaces” associated with metaphors, relying only on
literal truth and necessary consequences. The believing game
accepts believable conclusions to figure out new or revitalized
meanings in the premises and make sense of the whole argument
metaphorically (Elbow, 1998). By inhibiting the doubting game
operating in rule-governed deduction, the believing game might
lead to knowing something new or to see some previously
unveiled alternatives. The games are not exclusive even though
they cannot be played simultaneously, as some affective situations
may be more appropriate than others to play the believing vs. the
doubting game.
Depending on the affective coherence vs. incoherence between
the concepts involved in metaphor understanding, the interplay
between metaphorical and affective framing could be consistent
with both the possibility that emotional stimuli activated
concepts or images that required additional processing resources
in favor of the heuristic processes of the System 1 (at the expenses
of the System 2), and the possibility that the concepts activated by
emotional stimuli overlap with the representations necessary for
the resolution of the reasoning problem, thus favoring System 2
processes. Specifically, we can now answer the questions leading
us till here:
Q1. Under what conditions does the double framing effect of
emotive metaphors mostly influence the evaluation of the
argument, leading to a fallacy of equivocation?
R1. In the condition of affective incoherence rather than
affective coherence, the metaphorical and the affective
framing mostly interact, influencing the evaluation of
the argument, and increasing the ability to identify the
fallacy of equivocation. Under affective uncertainty,
participants are more prone to questioning the premises
of the arguments and the believability of the conclusion,
improving System 2-type analytical and local processes at
the expense of System 1-type global processes. The double
framing effect of emotive metaphors is most significant in
reasoning with conventional negatively valenced metaphors
and novel positively valenced metaphors, though for
different reasons. For conventional negatively valenced
metaphors, the arguments’ level of convincingness led
participants to discard them as fallacious. For positively
valenced metaphors, arguments’ emotional appeal and
the ambiguity between the metaphorical and literal
meanings of the premises led participants to identify the
equivocation fallacy.
Q2. Under what conditions does the metaphorical framing
influence the evaluation of an argument? Are participants
more prone to commit a fallacy of equivocation in
the case of conventional metaphors or in the case of
novel metaphors?
R2. In the condition of affective coherence rather than affective
incoherence, the metaphorical framing influences the
overall evaluation of an argument, leading to making
sense of the premises in light of the believed conclusion
via a global, System 1-type heuristic process. Especially
in the case of conventional metaphors, which are not
consciously processed as metaphors and whose intuitive
truth conditions are more difficult to question, participants
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are more prone to disattend System 2-type reasoning, thus
falling into the equivocation fallacy.
Q3. Under what conditions does the affective framing influence
the evaluation of the argument? Are participants more
prone to commit a fallacy of equivocation in the case of
negatively valenced metaphors or in the case of positively
valenced metaphors?
R3. In the condition of affective coherence rather than affective
incoherence, the affective framing influences the overall
evaluation of an argument via System 1-type processes,
i.e., leveraging on the convincingness and emotional
appeal of the arguments featuring emotive metaphors.
Especially in the case of negatively valenced metaphors,
participants are more prone to committing the equivocation
fallacy, accepting the believable conclusion and finding a
premise/conclusion connection alternative to the corrected
System 2-type logical connection.
CONCLUSIONS
Far from just leading to fallacies of reasoning, both metaphors
and emotions entail a framing effect that makes us see
things under a new perspective, influencing our decisions
and evaluations in many, and sometimes unexpected, ways.
Rather than always contrasting normative reasoning, the double
framing effect can promote creative heuristic processes and
increase logicality. Emotive metaphors do entail a double
framing effect in argumentation, coming from their being
metaphors and having an emotive (evaluative) connotation,
as hypothesized (H1), but they do not lead to equivocation
fallacies as expected. Depending on the contextual affective
coherence and incoherence of the first premise, respectively,
the double framing effect led participants to globally interpret
the argument as metaphoric, or locally detect the ambiguity
which leads to the equivocation fallacy. The metaphorical
framing effect is stronger for conventional metaphors and the
affective framing effect for negatively valenced metaphors, as
hypothesized (respectively in H2 and H3), but they are both
significant only when there is a more basic affective coherence
between the vehicle and the topic of the metaphor, which also
makes it possible to make more sense of the argument as
a whole.
The experiments were limited in only considering coherence
with respect to the affective valence of metaphors. Further
research should consider also the affective coherence with
respect to arousal and intensity (Clore and Schnall, 2005),
which could provide information about other dimensions of
the affective as well as metaphorical framing effect in reasoning
with emotive metaphors. More ecologically valid studies could
be designed to include the relevance of emotive metaphors to
participants’ emotional states and/or specific relevant properties
of the metaphor that could be crucially extended in the second
premises, thus further promoting a holistic interpretation of the
metaphoric fallacy. Further research is also needed to understand
whether, as Walton (1996) suggested, emotive metaphors are
not as responsible for ambiguity fallacies as for other clarity
fallacies. Finally, the double framing effect of emotive metaphors
might be further investigated in fallacious arguments which
explicitly appeal to emotions, to check whether conventional
negative metaphors and novel positive metaphors still help to
detect persuasive but fallacious arguments. This might also
help us to better understand when people play the believing
game or the doubting game (Elbow, 1998) in reasoning with
emotive metaphors.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 | Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) for each measure of the metaphors in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Emotional meaning Familiarity Meaningfulness Comprehension difficulty
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Rating study (Experiment 1) Metaphors
CM+ 4.36 0.48 3.48 1.04 4.43 0.52 1.47 0.47
NM+ 4.29 0.49 2.71 0.73 4.08 0.61 1.75 0.63
CM- 1.97 0.80 3.33 1.00 4.30 0.78 1.71 0.78
NM- 1.89 0.71 2.48 0.97 3.56 0.77 2.46 0.88
CM0 3.01 0.74 3.69 0.81 4.17 0.61 1.68 0.58
NM0 2.99 0.59 2.20 0.96 3.29 0.74 2.65 0.86
Rating study (Experiment 2) Metaphors
CM+ 4.10 0.51 3.11 0.81 3.96 0.49 1.88 0.55
NM+ 4.09 0.52 2.02 0.73 3.82 0.58 2.15 0.53
CM- 1.98 0.45 3.02 0.86 3.29 0.70 2.64 0.75
NM- 1.92 0.55 2.03 0.77 3.17 0.55 2.76 0.67
CM0 3.05 0.68 3.67 0.93 4.01 0.41 1.89 0.44
NM0 2.93 0.51 2.13 0.88 3.29 0.50 2.48 0.60
Positively valenced (CM+), negatively valenced (CM-), non-emotive (CM0) conventional metaphor. Positively valenced (NM+), negatively valenced (NM-), non-emotive (NM0)
novel metaphor.
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TABLE A2 | Table of materials in Italian for each middle term condition in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Non-emotive metaphors (0) Positive-valenced metaphors (+) Negative-valenced metaphors (–)
Experiment 1
CM [P1] Il corpo è un tempio. [P1] Un caffè è un ristoro. [P1] Un insulto è uno sfregio.
[P2] Un tempio è sacro. [P2] Un ristoro ridà benessere. [P2] Uno sfregio è una ferita.
[C] Il corpo è sacro. [C] Un caffè ridà benessere. [C] Un insulto è una ferita.
[P1] Una risata è un farmaco. [P1] Lo sport è la vitalità. [P1] Una separazione è un trauma.
[P2] Un farmaco serve alla salute. [P2] La vitalità è energia. [P2] Un trauma è un evento violento.
[C] Una risata serve alla salute. [C] Lo sport è energia. [C] Una separazione è un evento violento.
[P1] La vita è un capitolo. [P1] La tolleranza è un antidoto. [P1] Una sconfitta è un tonfo.
[P2] Un capitolo è una parte di un libro. [P2] Un antidoto contrasta i veleni. [P2] Un tonfo è una caduta a terra.
[C] La vita è una parte di un libro. [C] La tolleranza contrasta i veleni. [C] Una sconfitta è una caduta a terra.
[P1] Quella ragazza è una gemma. [P1] La pace è una schiarita. [P1] Il traffico è un ingorgo.
[P2] Una gemma è una pietra preziosa. [P2] Una schiarita è il ritorno del sereno. [P2] Un ingorgo è un intasamento.
[C] Quella ragazza è una pietra preziosa. [C] La pace è il ritorno del sereno. [C] Il traffico è un intasamento.
NM [P1] Il gallo è un faraone. [P1] La libertà è una risata. [P1] Lo smog è un accusato.
[P2] Un faraone è un capo. [P2] Una risata è un’espressione di gioia. [P2] Un accusato è un possibile colpevole.
[C] Il gallo è un capo. [C] La libertà è un’espressione di gioia. [C] Lo smog è un possibile colpevole.
[P1] Un grido è un megafono. [P1] Il tempo è un alleato. [P1] Il circo è una slealtà.
[P2] Un megafono emette suoni. [P2] Un alleato è un amico. [P2] Una slealtà è un’attività disonesta.
[C] Un grido emette suoni. [C] Il tempo è un amico. [C] Il circo è un’attività disonesta.
[P1] Il cuore è un’anfora. [P1] La serenità è un vaccino. [P1] La politica è un tugurio.
[P2] Un’anfora trasporta liquidi. [P2] Un vaccino rende immuni. [P2] Un tugurio è in pessime condizioni.
[C] Il cuore trasporta liquidi. [C] La serenità rende immuni. [C] La politica è in pessime condizioni.
[P1] Il lavoro è un badile. [P1] La felicità è un brillio. [P1] Un tradimento è un’ustione.
[P2] Un badile serve nei campi. [P2] Un brillio è una luminosità intensa. [P2] Un’ustione è una grave scottatura.
[C] Il lavoro serve nei campi. [C] La felicità è una luminosità intensa. [C] Un tradimento è una grave scottatura.
Experiment 2
CM [P1] Il corpo è un tempio. [P1] Una separazione è un ristoro. [P1] La finitura è uno sfregio.
[P2] Un tempio è sacro. [P2] Un ristoro ridà benessere. [P2] Uno sfregio è una ferita.
[C] Il corpo è sacro. [C] Una separazione ridà benessere. [C] La finitura è una ferita.
[P1] Una risata è un farmaco. [P1] La disubbidienza è la vitalità. [P1] L’eroismo è un trauma.
[P2] Un farmaco serve alla salute. [P2] La vitalità è energia. [P2] Un trauma è un evento violento.
[C] Una risata serve alla salute. [C] La disubbidienza è energia. [C] L’eroismo è un evento violento.
[P1] La vita è un capitolo. [P1] L’indifferenza è un antidoto. [P1] L’ammirazione è un tonfo.
[P2] Un capitolo è una parte di un libro. [P2] Un antidoto contrasta i veleni. [P2] Un tonfo è una caduta a terra.
[C] La vita è una parte di un libro. [C] L’indifferenza contrasta i veleni. [C] L’ammirazione è una caduta a terra.
[P1] Quella ragazza è una gemma. [P1] Un distacco è una schiarita. [P1] Lo spettacolo è un ingorgo.
[P2] Una gemma è una pietra preziosa. [P2] Una schiarita è il ritorno del sereno. [P2] Un ingorgo è un intasamento.
[C] Quella ragazza è una pietra preziosa. [C] Un distacco è il ritorno del sereno. [C] Lo spettacolo è un intasamento.
NM [P1] Il gallo è un faraone. [P1] L’insolenza è una risata. [P1] Il bagno è un accusato.
[P2] Un faraone è un capo. [P2] Una risata è un’espressione di gioia. [P2] Un accusato è un possibile colpevole.
[C] Il gallo è un capo. [C] L’insolenza è un’espressione di gioia. [C] Il bagno è un possibile colpevole.
(Continued)
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TABLE A2 | Continued
Non-emotive metaphors (0) Positive-valenced metaphors (+) Negative-valenced metaphors (–)
[P1] Un grido è un megafono. [P1] Il silenzio è un alleato. [P1] Il casinò è una slealtà.
[P2] Un megafono emette suoni. [P2] Un alleato è un amico. [P2] Una slealtà è un’attività disonesta.
[C] Un grido emette suoni. [C] Il silenzio è un amico. [C] Il casinò è un’attività disonesta.
[P1] Il cuore è un’anfora. [P1] Il dolore è un vaccino. [P1] L’ateneo è un tugurio.
[P2] Un’anfora trasporta liquidi. [P2] Un vaccino rende immuni. [P2] Un tugurio è in pessime condizioni.
[C] Il cuore trasporta liquidi. [C] Il dolore rende immuni. [C] L’ateneo è in pessime condizioni.
[P1] Il lavoro è un badile. [P1] Una battaglia è un brillio. [P1] La religione è un’ustione.
[P2] Un badile serve nei campi. [P2] Un brillio è una luminosità intensa. [P2] Un’ustione è una grave scottatura.
[C] Il lavoro serve nei campi. [C] Una battaglia è una luminosità intensa. [C] La religione è una grave scottatura.
TABLE A3 | Table of literal arguments (fillers in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2).
Strong arguments Weak arguments Arguments with plausible conclusion
Literal [P1] Il cane rincorre il gatto. [P1] La sarta rammenda il vestito. [P1] Chiara ha una zia.
[P2] Il gatto è un felino. [P2] Il vestito è un indumento. [P2] Una zia è la moglie dello zio.
[C] Il cane rincorre un felino. [C] La sarta è un indumento. [C] Chiara è la moglie dello zio.
[P1] Brad Pitt è una persona. [P1] Il lunedì inizia la settimana. [P1] Antonio richiama un soldato.
[P2] Una persona è un essere umano. [P2] La settimana ha sette giorni. [P2] Un soldato è un militare.
[C] Brad Pitt è un essere umano. [C] Il lunedì ha sette giorni. [C] Antonio è un militare.
[P1] Il Louvre è un museo. [P1] La nonna prepara la cena. [P1] La nipote visita la zia.
[P2] Un museo espone oggetti. [P2] La cena è un pasto. [P2] La zia ha sessant’anni.
[C] Il Louvre espone oggetti. [C] La nonna è un pasto. [C] La nipote ha sessant’anni.
[P1] La mucca produce il latte. [P1] Melania mangia la mela. [P1] Carla possiede una bottiglia.
[P2] Il latte è un alimento. [P2] La mela è un frutto. [P2] Una bottiglia ha un collo.
[C] La mucca produce un alimento. [C] Melania è un frutto. [C] Carla ha un collo.
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